Using the results of a national identity survey, we test the impact of religious affiliation on trade and immigration-policy preferences of U.S. residents while controlling for individual level of skill, political ideology, and other important demographic characteristics. Our results show that religion is an important determinant of international-policy preferences as individuals who are pre-Vatican II Catholic or members of a fundamentalist Protestant denomination are more likely to prefer policies that restrict imports and immigration. Religiosity, in contrast, has a separate effect of moderating attitudes toward immigration. In addition, we find evidence of denominational effects among African Americans in that members of fundamentalist denominations tend to favor policies that restrict imports while others do not, implying that statistical results commonly attributed to racial effects may actually be a religion effect.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss the economic consequences of religious participation and why religion might matter for international-policy preferences. In Section II we outline recent models of individual preferences for trade and immigration policies. In Section III we describe the data used in the study. In Section IV we explain our econometric approach and provide results. Finally, we offer a conclusion and suggestions for further research in Section V.
I. Religious Affiliation, Participation and Attitudes toward International Policies
In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of economics and religion into three categories. The first line of research deals with the micro-foundations of religious participation, the second addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious participation, while the third line of research invokes religious teachings to critique economic policies. This study is in keeping with the second area of research. The reader is referred to Iannaccone for a comprehensive review of the literature in all three areas.
A. Religion and Economic Performance
There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the economic consequences of religious affiliation on economic activity and growth in the literature. Because of space considerations, we highlight but a few relevant papers here. The most recent studies on the link between religious participation and economic outcomes include Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) , who employ survey data covering sixty-six countries. The authors find that religion promotes the development of positive attitudes toward cooperation and the rule of law and government that are conducive to economic growth. In contrast, they also find that religious individuals are less tolerant of women working and more racist. By controlling for the dominant religion in each nation, they show that these effects differ across denominations.
In a similar manner, Barro and McCleary (2003) use survey data covering fifty-nine countries and find that economic growth is positively affected by religious beliefs, but negatively by church attendance even while controlling for possible reverse causation. In a similar manner, Mehanna (2002) finds that 4 countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, as measured by imports as a percentage of GDP, than Catholic or Muslim nations.
B. Why Would Religion Matter for Trade and Immigration?
According to religion and sociology scholars such as Ammerman (1991) , Marsden (1991) , and Tamney (2002) , modernization, industrialization, and urbanization of the early twentieth century challenged both the moral certainty and social dominance of traditional Protestantism. The fundamentalist movement was, therefore, a religious-based social movement counteracting encroaching secularism and modernization. Coreno (2002, p. 337) argues that "… fundamentalists often form small interconnected independent denominations in the hope of protecting a quarantined traditionalist culture inside a network of church-based institutions. They nourish these enclave communities by separating themselves as much as possible from mainline churches in particular and secular culture in general." He adds that southern fundamentalist denominations, in particular, support a stronger sense of separatism. Moderate and liberal Protestants, in contrast, are less threatened by secular society and tend to thrive more in a modern world.
They are also less concerned with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious beliefs as more personal and private. Further, moderate or mainline denominations tend to relate more inclusively with other denominations and engage more in ecumenical activities.
In regard to Catholics, Putnam (1993) argues that the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy hinders cooperation and trust of outsiders. Welch et al. (2004) , in contrast, claim that, at least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that Catholics would trust "outsiders" any less than mainstream Protestants. They claim that the American Catholic Church is substantially different from the Church in Italy, and that most U.S. Catholic parishes do not maintain a rigid boundary against the outside culture. They further argue that there may well be a difference among Catholics who were socialized into pre-Vatican II traditions relative to the younger group of post-Vatican II Catholics.
Generalizing these various studies, we hypothesize that different religious denominations, or networks, generate different types of social capital and, therefore, that the differing approaches of Fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations toward modernization and encroaching 5 secularism will be reflected in differing attitudes of individual members towards others outside of the individual's religious network. More specifically, we argue that fundamentalist denominations, on the one hand, are networks that generate Putnam's (2003, p. 23 
II. Modeling Individual Trade and Immigration Policy Preferences
Recent examinations of trade and immigration-policy preferences focus on two common models of international trade policy preferences: the Ricardo-Viner model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Both theories consider the effect of increased trade on input factors' returns and provide a framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of international trade on their income. Because the literature is extensive, we focus only on the most recent and otherwise refer the interested reader to the surveys provided in Slaughter (2001a and 2001b) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003).
Scheve and Slaughter employ individual-level survey data for the United States to identify if individual skill level or factor type is a significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. In the course of their analysis, they make an important contribution by showing that education, income, and employment classification all serve as a proxy measure of skill level. Hence, only one of these variables should be included in any model of trade or immigration policy preferences. Their major finding is that factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade and immigration-policy preferences. Other demographic characteristics, entered as tests of the robustness of factor type, such as gender, race, and trade union membership were also found to be significant determinants. 
III. Survey Data
The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) titled ISSP: National Identity.
2 In the United States, the ISSP is administered as part of the General Social Survey, but only a subset of the GSS participants are administered the ISSP questionnaire. 3 The combination of both the ISSP and the GSS surveys yield a unique data set as the 1996 ISSP portion contains questions on imports and immigration while the GSS portion contains, in additional to standard demographic data, detailed information on the individual's religious affiliation and religiosity. Though information on religious affiliation is reported back to the ISSP, the GSS makes much finer distinctions among denominations that are not found in the ISSP data. Because of the uniquely heterogeneous nature of religion in the United
States, these distinctions are not available for other countries in the ISSP data and, therefore, we limit our analysis here to residents of the United States.
A. Description of the Dependent Variables
The first survey item used in this study asks: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy?" Five possible responses range from agree strongly to strongly disagree. The second item asks: "Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be increased or decreased?" Five possible responses rage from increased a lot to reduced a lot. Those who could not choose or refused to answer the questions were coded as missing. Table 1 provides the survey items on policy preferences, summarizes the responses, and indicates the proportion of missing observations. Following the literature, we control for a number of factors that may shape an individual's international economic policy preferences. In general, we control for demographics, individual skill level, sector of employment, and political ideology, while testing the significance of religious affiliation and religiosity.
Each variable is described below and summary data is provided in Table 2 . Table 2 1
. Demographic Variables
NonCitizen is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a citizen with a value of zero or non-citizen with a value of unity. It is expected that non-citizens are more likely to oppose policies that restrict trade and favor policies that increase immigration. Female is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity for female and zero for male. Previous studies find evidence, though not consistently significant, indicating that women are more likely to support trade barriers, but that gender is not a significant determinant of immigration-policy preferences. Age is a continuous variable. It is hypothesized that older respondents are more likely to favor policies that restrict international trade and immigration, though age has not been shown to be a consistently significant determinant of global economic policy preferences.
Social Class is the individual's perspective of their soci-economic status. It is a discrete variable that ranges in value from unity for lower class to six for upper class. South is a dummy variable for the south U.S Census region. Individuals in the other three regions, therefore, serve as the benchmark for the estimated differential impact of the south. The research on religion and economic growth indicates that a dominant religion affects the culture of a nation and may be the source of cross-country differences in attitudes toward markets and market processes. Hence, if a particular religion dominates a region of a nation, we may see a regional effect that is actually reflecting the influence of the dominant religion along the lines suggested by von der Ruhr and Daniels (2004 as found in Campa and Goldberg (1997) . In contrast to Mayda and Rodrik, we also measure the export and import shares of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries using data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and we proxy for mining, using export and import shares for the coal industry from the National Mining Association.
We create two dummy variables using the data above in combination with the 1988 Standard Industrial Classification three-digit code contained in the GSS data. The first variable, Comparative
Advantage, assigns a value of unity to respondents employed in industries with a positive adjusted net export measure and zero to all others. The second variable, Comparative Disadvantage, assigns unity to individuals in industries with a negative adjusted net export measure and zero to all others. The base group, therefore, is individuals employed all other industries and assumed to be non-trading industries.
Religious Affiliation
The survey instrument asked individuals if they belong to a major religious group. There were approximately 30 denominations the individual could identify with including Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, major Protestant denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddist, and Sikh. Individuals were also allowed to select no affiliation or to refuse to answer. In our sample, individuals identified with Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, and two refused to answer and were coded as missing. The frequency of attending religious services, Religiosity, is included in each model 11 containing religious affiliation. This variable ranges from zero for individuals that do not attend at all during the course of a year to eight for those who attend more than once a week.
As previously indicated, the GSS provides additional coding for individuals that took part in the ISSP, allowing much finer distinction of religious affiliation in the United States. The National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) provides a classification scheme of Protestant denominations along the fundamentalist-moderate-liberal spectrum, and GSS Methodological Report Number 43 provides details and a complete listing of denominations in their respective categories. According to Smith (1987 Smith ( , 1990 , the NORC framework uses biblical inerrancy, beliefs in the personal salvation or born-again experience, beliefs in the personal and imminent return of Christ, evangelical or revivalist attitudes, and acceptance of traditional Protestant beliefs such as the existence of angels and devils, as metrics to separate denominations along the fundamentalist -liberal spectrum. Using this classification system, we reestimate the empirical models to determine if there are differential effects among Protestant denominations along the fundamentalist to liberal spectrum.
C. The Second Vatican Council
The Second Vatican Council represents the most significant change in Catholic doctrine and Catholic social teaching in the past 450 years. Scholars such as Roof and McKinney (1987) and Greeley (1981) 
IV. Econometric Results
Our objective is to determine if an individual's religious affiliation holds any additional insight into their trade and immigration-policy preferences. Our approach, therefore, is to add religious affiliation and religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences described earlier, thereby controlling for other important individual demographic, economic, and political characteristics. Given that the multiple categories of responses to the survey questions follow a natural order, we use an ordered probit model. Table 3 provides the ordered-probit estimates for the survey item on whether the United States should restrict imports. As with other ordered choice models, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of the ordered probit models are notoriously difficult to interpret. In this section we discuss those coefficients that are significant. In section D, we simulate the relative effects of the key variables. 
A. Attitudes toward International Trade Policies

B. Attitudes toward Immigration Policies
Table 4
Model 2 adds the major religious denominations and the results indicate that Protestants are more likely to support policies that restrict immigration while greater religiosity actually moves individuals to prefer policies that increase immigration. This result for religiosity supports the hypothesis that greater participation in a religious network builds bridging social caption and a broader sense of identity and reciprocity and that affiliation and religiosity are two separate effects. 
C. Interpretation of Model Estimates
To better understand the impact of religious affiliation on global-policy preferences, we simulate the effect of key variables so as to isolate the impact on the probability that an individual chooses one of the responses to the survey questions detailed in Table 1 (along the lines suggested in King et al., 2000) . The simulations are conducted using Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results (Tomz et al., 2001) . The process involves drawing 1,000 simulated parameters from an asymptotic sampling distribution that is multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates. Next the simulated parameters are used to calculate two sets of probabilities.
Using religious affiliation as an example, we first re-estimate model 5 and then set all binary explanatory variables at their majority value (so that female is equal to one while noncitizen, south, African American, Union Member, comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage are equal to zero), all denomination variables at zero, and the remaining variables at their mean value. In other words, the "typical" individual in our data set is treated as if they have no religious affiliation. From this we generate the predicted probability of response to each category of the survey question. Next, we change every individual's affiliation to, say, fundamentalist and repeat the simulation generating new predicted probabilities. To get a sense of the relative importance of religious affiliation, we include the simulated effects of a one-standard-deviation reduction in education−shown in previous studies as a highly significant determinant of trade and immigration-policy attitudes−as a benchmark. The changes in predicted probabilities for variables of interest are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 1. Policies to Restrict Imports Figure 1 shows the change in predicted probabilities for the five categories of the question on restricting imports for model 5 in Table 3 . In general, the figure shows how each variable of interest shifts the distribution of probable responses upward, that is, toward the categories of "agree strongly" and "agree" away from the categories of "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," and "disagree strongly." The mean value of education is approximately 13.5 years. We change this variable to its 25 th percentile
value−approximately 12 years−to obtain the marginal effects of education. Next, education is set at its mean value again and all respondents are coded as fundamentalist and the probabilities are simulated again. This is then repeated for pre-Vatican II Catholics. Figure 1 shows that the denominational effects rival that of education, as pre-Vatican II increases the probability that an individual will agree strongly with policies that restrict imports by more than 9.5 percent and fundamentalist by more that 7.5 percent, while a one-standard-deviation reduction in education (from 1.5 years of post-high-school education to a high-school education) increases this probability by 4.5 percent. For the category of "agree," however, the changes are 4.1, 3.7, and 5.7 percent, respectively. Nonetheless, the religion effects dominate the education effect in three of the five categories. To present this in another way, education would need to be reduced to ten-and-one-half years (from the mean of thirteen-and-one-half years) to generate the same impact on attitudes as these two denominational effects.
Figure 1
2. Policies to Change Immigration into the Respondent's Country Figure 2 illustrates the change in the simulated probabilities for the various response categories for education, fundamentalist, pre-Vatican II Catholic, and religiosity. As the figure shows, the pre-Vatican II effect is relatively larger than religiosity and education as the probability that they support policies that reduce immigration a lot increases by 10.9 percent. If the individual belongs to a fundamentalist denomination, the increase is 10 percent, and if education is reduced by one-and-one-half years it is 3.6 percent. The simulation for religiosity represents an increase from the mean value by plus one standard deviation (from attending services roughly one a month to nearly every week). The effect of this increase in religiosity is to decrease the probability that an individual will favor policies that restrict immigration a lot by 2.1 percent and to reduce immigration a little by slightly less than 0.5 percent.
Figure 2 V. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force that shapes and Second, religious organization may also affect foreign policy through ideas. Because religious organizations deal with issues such as equality, just war, and subsidiarity, they can help to illuminate and influence perceptions of globalization and facilitate debate on foreign-policy issues. As a result, religious values and norms play an indirect, not direct, role in the formation of foreign policy by affecting the attitudes of individuals and thereby shaping public opinion. Finally, because religious organizations provide important humanitarian assistance, they can affect foreign policy through service.
We argue that this second avenue of influence is important for trade and immigration policy decisions, in spite of the fact that there is little in the literature to date that examines the link between religious affiliation and attitudes toward global economic policies. We suggest that future research also consider how the impact of religion on policy preferences is changing across generations of religious adherents. 
